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ABSTRACT 
Recently, a circuit split has arisen with regard to the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The circuit split concerns the 
question of what it takes for an individual to qualify as a “whistleblower” 
under the terms of the statute. This circuit split is surprising, as the Dodd-
Frank Act purports to answer this question itself by providing a definition of 
this term, a definition which the Fifth Circuit has treated as being conclusive. 
Nonetheless, the Second and the Ninth Circuits have held that with respect 
to some, but not all, of the Dodd-Frank Act, this statutory “whistleblower” 
definition does not apply. Shortly, the Supreme Court will have the 
opportunity to resolve the matter when it hears an appeal of the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in Somers v. Digital Realty Trust Inc. This article provides 
three broad reasons why the Supreme Court should reject the Second and 
Ninth Circuits’ interpretations. First, the interpretation endorsed by the 
Second and Ninth Circuits is the result of a flawed exercise in statutory 
interpretation that incorrectly applies principles recently set down by the 
Supreme Court in King v. Burwell, and Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA. 
Secondly, while the Second and Ninth Circuits rejected the Fifth Circuits’ 
interpretation on the basis that it withholds the protection of the Dodd-Frank 
Act from auditors and attorneys, the Second and Ninth Circuits’ preferred 
interpretations also fail to protect auditors and attorneys. Finally, the policy 
reasons in favor of extending the Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower 
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protections to auditors and attorneys are insufficiently strong to warrant 
departing from the natural meaning of the statutory language at issue. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Suppose an employee discovers that members of his or her organization 
have been engaging in securities law violations. If the employee disapproves 
of the misconduct, he or she will be placed in an awkward position. On the 
one hand, the employee will want to report the illegal activity to someone in 
a position of sufficient authority to put a stop to it. On the other hand, the 
employee may be reluctant to report the misconduct as doing so could result 
in retaliation by those individuals who are complicit in it. 
Part of the solution to this conundrum is provided by the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (The “Dodd-Frank Act”).1 
The Dodd-Frank Act is a financial regulatory statute conceived by the Obama 
Administration and enacted in 2010 which, among other things, implemented 
a system of rights and protections for whistleblowers of securities law 
violations.2 The Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower scheme has two broad 
limbs. The first limb, which this article does not discuss in any detail, rewards 
whistleblowers whose information leads to successful enforcement action by 
the Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”), by giving them a portion of 
the amount collected by the SEC in monetary sanctions (in certain 
circumstances).3 The second limb of the Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower 
system, which is the subject of this article, prohibits employers from 
retaliating against whistleblowers (“Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime”).4 If an 
employer retaliates against a whistleblower “in the terms and conditions of 
employment” (for example, by demoting the whistleblower or terminating 
the whistleblower’s employment), then the whistleblower can bring federal 
court proceedings against the employer to enforce their rights under the 
Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime.5 If successful, the whistleblower will be 
                                                                                                                           
 
1 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6 (West 2010). 
2 Id. 
3 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(b)(1) (West 2010). A whistleblower will not be entitled to an award if he or 
she was acting in a regulatory or law enforcement capacity when he or she acquired the information, or if 
he or she has been convicted of a criminal offense in relation to the subject matter of the whistleblowing 
(see 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(c)(2) (West 2010)). 
4 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(i) (West 2010). 
5 Id. 
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entitled to reinstatement to his or her job, twice the amount of back pay owed, 
and compensation for litigation costs.6 
The Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime does not protect all of those who 
tattle though—only those who satisfy the Dodd-Frank Act’s statutory criteria 
are eligible for relief. This article is concerned with the question of what 
those statutory criteria are. Looking at the wording of the Dodd-Frank Act in 
isolation, one could be forgiven for thinking that this is a straightforward 
question to answer. As the Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime purports only to 
protect “whistleblowers,” a term which is comprehensively defined in the 
Dodd-Frank Act,7 one would expect that someone will only be eligible for 
protection if he or she fits within the whistleblower definition. 
Contrary to this expectation, a circuit split, or difference of judicial 
opinion, has developed. While the Fifth Circuit has affirmed the intuitive 
view that the Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime applies only to those who 
satisfy the Dodd-Frank Act’s definition of “whistleblower,” the Second and 
Ninth Circuits have declared that the ambit of the Dodd-Frank Retaliation 
Regime stretches beyond the confines of this statutory term. This circuit split 
will soon be resolved when the Supreme Court hears the case of Digital 
Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, which is due to be heard in the 2017–2018 term.8 
The aim of this article is to explain why the Second and Ninth Circuits’ 
approach is not only unorthodox, but also incorrect as a matter of both law 
and policy, and that the Supreme Court should therefore reject it and adopt 
the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation instead. 
This article proceeds as follows. First, Section II sets out the competing 
interpretations and the reasons provided by the various circuit courts in 
support of them. Next, Section III critiques the Second and Ninth Circuits’ 
statutory interpretation. This analysis will focus on the proper application of 
two recent Supreme Court decisions which held that a statutory word or term 
can have multiple and inconsistent meanings within the same piece of 
legislation. Finally, Section IV concludes the article by analyzing the two 
main policy arguments supporting the Second and Ninth Circuits’ 
interpretation. 
                                                                                                                           
 
6 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(h)(1)(C) (West 2010). 
7 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(a)(6) (West 2010). 
8 Somers v. Digital Realty Trust, Inc., 850 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 85 U.S.L.W. 
3600 (U.S. June 26, 2017) (No. 16-1276). 
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II. “WHISTLEBLOWER”: TWO COMPETING INTERPRETATIONS 
A circuit split has arisen out of an apparent inconsistency between two 
provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act: its statutory definition of “whistleblower,” 
and the types of conduct that the Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime states that 
it applies to. Starting first with the definition of “whistleblower,” the Dodd-
Frank Act explicitly defines this term as: “any individual who provides, or 2 
or more individuals acting jointly who provide, information relating to a 
violation of the securities laws to the [SEC],9 in a manner established, by rule 
or regulation, by the [SEC].”10 Viewed in isolation, the effect of this 
definition appears to be clear—to qualify for protection from the Dodd-Frank 
Retaliation Regime, an individual must report a securities law violation 
directly to the SEC, and in the manner dictated by the SEC. 
Next, the Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime prohibits employers from 
retaliating against whistleblowers in response to three categories of conduct: 
(i) providing information to the [SEC] in accordance with [15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-
6]; 
(ii) initiating, testifying in, or assisting in any investigation or judicial or 
administrative action of the [SEC] based upon or related to such 
information; or 
(iii) making disclosures that are required or protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002 . . . [Chapter 2B], including section 78j-1(m) of [Title 15], 
section 1513(e) of Title 18, and any other law, rule, or regulation subject to 
the jurisdiction of the [SEC].11 
The source of the circuit split is the third category of conduct in the 
quoted passage above, which will henceforth be referred to as “subdivision 
(iii).” While subdivisions (i) and (ii) fall in line with the Dodd-Frank Act’s 
whistleblower definition, by referring to individuals who provide 
information to the SEC, several of the types of conduct described in 
subdivision (iii) involve disclosures to entities other than the SEC. For 
example, subdivision (iii) refers to “disclosures . . . protected under the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act,” a statute which, among other things, protects 
                                                                                                                           
 
9 The Securities and Exchange Commission is referred to as the “Commission” throughout the 
Dodd-Frank Act; see 15 U.S.C.A. § 78d(a) (West 2016). 
10 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(a)(6) (West 2010). 
11 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(i)–(iii) (West 2010). 
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employees of publicly traded companies who report illegal activity to their 
supervisors.12 It therefore appears that subdivision (iii) was intended to 
protect such individuals. However, as employees who make this type of 
disclosure will not have made the disclosure to the SEC, they will not qualify 
as “whistleblowers,” and will fall outside the Dodd-Frank Retaliation 
Regime’s ambit.13 
Accordingly, a tension exists within the Dodd-Frank Retaliation 
Regime. While, the Dodd-Frank Act restricts the “whistleblower” definition 
to include only people who have made disclosures to the SEC, subdivision 
(iii) then appears to attempt to extend protection to individuals who have not 
made such a disclosure. The circuit courts have formulated two competing 
solutions to this tension. The first interpretation, which has been adopted by 
the Fifth Circuit, reads the text of the Dodd-Frank Act literally by treating its 
whistleblower definition as all-defining, and necessarily restricting 
subdivision (iii)’s ambit (“Literal Interpretation”).14 The upshot is that 
individuals who do not report to the SEC are ineligible for protection from 
the Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime. The alternative interpretation, which 
was originally created by the SEC using its rule-making powers under the 
Dodd-Frank Act,15 and which subsequently found favor in the Second and 
Ninth Circuits, takes a more expansive approach (“Expansive 
Interpretation”). The expansive interpretation views the Dodd-Frank Act’s 
core whistleblower definition as irreconcilable with the wording of 
subdivision (iii). That being so, the expansive interpretation effectively 
redefines the word “whistleblower” in subdivision (iii) to include individuals 
who have not reported to the SEC, thereby expanding the breadth of the 
Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime. 
                                                                                                                           
 
12 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A(a)(1)(C); see Connolly v. Remkes, 2014 WL 5473144 at *4 (N.D. Cal. 
Oct. 28, 2014). 
13 It is also worth noting that if the reported illegal activity was something other than a securities 
law violation, then the individual would also not fit within the Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower definition, 
as they would not have provided “information relating to a violation of securities law.” See 15 U.S.C.A. 
§ 78u-6(a)(6) (West 2010). 
14 Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013). 
15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(j) (West 2010). 
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A. The Fifth Circuit’s Literal Interpretation 
The first circuit court to tackle this issue was the Fifth Circuit in the 
2013 decision of Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C. (“Asadi”).16 Shortly 
after reporting suspicious activity to his supervisor, the plaintiff received a 
negative performance review and was asked to accept a demotion.17 The 
plaintiff refused the demotion and was subsequently fired.18 As the plaintiff 
had only reported the issue internally, and not to the SEC, he did not satisfy 
the Dodd-Frank Act’s definition of “whistleblower.” In response, the 
plaintiff argued that the Fifth Circuit should adopt the expansive 
interpretation.19 The primary reason given by the plaintiff in support of this 
argument was that strictly applying the Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower 
definition would effectively render subdivision (iii) insignificant, as most of 
the types of conduct described in subdivision (iii) involve reporting to entities 
other than the SEC.20 The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument and adopted 
the literal interpretation for three primary reasons. 
First, and most obviously, the expansive interpretation ignores the 
Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower definition. In doing so, the Expansive 
Interpretation violates two core canons of statutory interpretation: 
specifically, that the courts should “give effect, if possible, to every word and 
every provision Congress used,”21 and must “interpret provisions of a statute 
in a manner that renders them compatible, not contradictory.”22 
Secondly, and in response to the plaintiff’s submission that the literal 
interpretation renders subdivision (iii) insignificant, the Fifth Circuit held 
that subdivision (iii) does in fact have a role to play under the literal 
interpretation. Specifically, subdivision (iii) will apply where an individual 
engages in a type of reporting described in subdivision (iii), and also 
discloses the problem to the SEC, but the employer only takes retributory 
                                                                                                                           
 
16 720 F.3d at 621. 
17 Id. at 620. 
18 Id. at 621. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 626. See also Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., 2011 WL 1672066 at *4 (cited in Asadi, 720 
F.3d at 624 n.6). 
21 Asadi, 720 F.3d at 622, 628 (citing Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001)). 
22 Id. at 622 (citing Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 
133 (U.S. 2000)). 
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action with respect to the subdivision (iii) report.23 For example, suppose that 
an employee reports a securities law violation to both the employer’s CEO 
(a type of disclosure protected by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and therefore 
canvassed by subdivision (iii)),24 and to the SEC. In response, the employer, 
who is unaware that the employee reported the issue to the SEC, fires the 
employee. In these circumstances the employer retaliated against the 
employee’s internal report, not against the employee’s report to the SEC (as 
it is not possible to retaliate against something of which you are unaware). 
Accordingly, subdivisions (i) and (iii) of the Dodd-Frank Retaliation 
Regime, which prohibit employers from retaliating against employees for 
providing information to the SEC,25 or assisting an SEC investigation,26 will 
not apply. Instead, the employee will be protected by subdivision (iii). 
Therefore, subdivision (iii) serves a real and valuable function by protecting 
the employee from types of retaliation not covered by the other provisions of 
the Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime.27 
The third and final reason given by the Fifth Circuit for rejecting the 
expansive interpretation was that it effectively renders the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act’s retaliation provisions redundant in a securities law setting.28 As 
Subdivision (iii) includes “disclosures required or protected by the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act,” under the expansive interpretation any individual who makes a 
securities law violation disclosure covered by that statute will automatically 
receive protection from the Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime.29 The Fifth 
Circuit opined that while there is a great deal of overlap between the 
whistleblower schemes set out in the Dodd-Frank Act and the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, the Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime’s protections are consistently 
superior.30 Principally, claims under the Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime are 
                                                                                                                           
 
23 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(i)–(iii) (West 2010). 
24 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A(a)(1)(C) (2012). 
25 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(i) (2012). 
26 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(ii) (2012). 
27 Asadi, 720 F.3d at 627–29. 
28 720 F.3d at 626. 
29 Id. 
30 For example, the Dodd-Frank regime allows for the whistleblower to receive twice the amount 
of any pay lost due to the retaliation, whereas the Sarbanes-Oxley regime only allows recovery of the back 
pay, and the Dodd-Frank regime has longer limitation periods than the Sarbanes-Oxley regime. 
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subject to a longer limitation period,31 and are eligible for a larger back pay 
award,32 than claims under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s whistleblower scheme. 
Accordingly, individuals who qualify for protection under the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, and by implication are also entitled to protection from subdivision 
(iii), would consistently bring their legal claims under the Dodd-Frank 
Retaliation Regime rather than invoke their Sarbanes-Oxley rights.33 
B. The Second and Ninth Circuits’ Expansive Interpretation 
Two years after Asadi was decided, the same issue was brought before 
the Second Circuit in Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC (“Berman”).34 Rather than 
following the lead of the Fifth Circuit, the Second Circuit created a circuit 
split by ruling that reporting to the SEC is not a prerequisite to receiving 
protection from the Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime.35 More recently, in 
Somers v. Digital Realty Trust Inc.,36 the Ninth Circuit also endorsed the 
expansive interpretation, albeit the methodology it applied to reach that 
outcome was slightly different from that used by the Second Circuit. In short, 
while both Circuits began by rejecting Asadi, the Second Circuit concluded 
its judgment by declining to interpret subdivision (iii) itself and applying 
Chevron deference to the SEC’s rule instead.37 The Ninth Circuit, on the 
other hand, did engage in a process of substantively interpreting subdivision 
(iii), a process which led to the same outcome as that reached by the SEC and 
the Second Circuit.38 Nonetheless, as will be seen, the differences between 
                                                                                                                           
 
31 The limitation period for whistleblower claims under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act expires 180 days 
after the date of the violation, or 180 days after the date on which the whistleblower becomes aware of 
the violation. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A(b)(2)(D) (2012). Depending on the circumstances, the limitation 
period for claims under the Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime can range from three to ten years. See 
generally 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(iii) (2012). 
32 Claimants under the Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime are eligible for an award equivalent to twice 
the amount of back pay owing. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78-6(h)(1)(C)(ii) (2012). However, a claimant under 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act may only receive the exact amount of back pay owing with interest. 18 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1514A(c)(2)(B) (2012). 
33 Asadi, 720 F.3d at 628–29. 
34 Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 146 (2d Cir. 2015). 
35 Id. 
36 Somers v. Digital Realty Tr. Inc., 850 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2017). 
37 Berman, 801 F.3d at 157. 
38 Somers, 850 F.3d at 1050. However, the Ninth Circuit did note at 1051 that if it had been unable 
to resolve the ambiguity in the statute itself then it would have reached the same overall result by deferring 
to the SEC’s interpretation. 
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the Second and Ninth Circuit’s judgments are ultimately not as great as they 
first appear, with each court largely endorsing the same arguments in favor 
of the expansive interpretation, and against the literal interpretation. 
Both the Second and Ninth Circuits began by conceding that there is no 
“absolute conflict” between the statutory whistleblower definition and 
subdivision (iii), as they can be reconciled in the manner envisaged in 
Asadi.39 However, the two circuit courts asserted that the scope of 
subdivision (iii), under the literal interpretation, is significantly narrower 
than the Fifth Circuit had acknowledged.40 There are two reasons for this. 
First, and more practically, an individual deciding whether to disclose 
wrongdoing to the SEC at the same time he or she reports it internally may 
be reluctant to do so as: “[he or she] will surely feel that reporting only to 
their employer offers the prospect of having the wrongdoing ended, with little 
chance of retaliation, whereas reporting to a government agency creates a 
substantial risk of retaliation.”41 
Secondly, and more fundamentally, two types of reporting described in 
subdivision (iii) relate to individuals who are unable legally to disclose an 
issue to the SEC at the same time they disclose it internally: auditors and 
attorneys. In the case of auditors, Chapter 2B of Title 15 requires auditors of 
securities issuers to report any illegal activity they discover to the issuer’s 
management,42 and prohibits auditors from reporting to the SEC until the 
issuer has had the opportunity to take remedial action (and has failed to do 
so).43 The upshot is that auditors are essentially left unprotected by 
subdivision (iii) under the literal interpretation, as in most cases, the issuer 
will retaliate before it becomes apparent to the auditor that remedial action 
has not occurred.44 With respect to attorneys, the cumulative effect of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the SEC’s Standards of Professional Conduct is that 
an issuer’s attorney who discovers a material violation of securities law must 
first report it to the issuer’s chief legal counsel or CEO.45 If the chief legal 
counsel or CEO does not respond appropriately, then the attorney must report 
                                                                                                                           
 
39 Berman, 801 F.3d at 150. 
40 Id. at 151; Somers, 850 F.3d at 1049. 
41 Berman, 801 F.3d at 151. See also Somers, 850 F.3d at 1049–50. 
42 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1(b)(1)(B) (West 2017) (“Issuer” is defined in § 78c(a)(8)). 
43 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1(b)(2)–(3) (West 2017). 
44 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1(b)(1)(B) (West 2017). 
45 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1) (2017). 
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the issue to the issuer’s audit committee or board of directors.46 Only after 
this has occurred can the attorney then report the violation to the SEC, and 
even then only in “limited instances,”47 specifically where doing so will 
rectify a serious violation of securities law that occurred through the use of 
the attorney’s services, or will prevent the issuer from committing perjury or 
a serious violation of securities law.48 Again, the consequence is that 
attorneys receive little to no protection from subdivision (iii) under the literal 
interpretation.49 
After finding that the literal interpretation narrows subdivision (iii) to a 
greater extent than recognized in Asadi, the Second and Ninth Circuits turned 
to the question of whether the expansive interpretation is correct.50 It was at 
this stage that the two circuit courts diverged to some extent. Starting first 
with the Second Circuit, rather than deliver a judicial interpretation of 
subdivision (iii), the Court held that the tension between this provision and 
the core whistleblower definition in the statute created a sufficient ambiguity 
to warrant the granting of Chevron deference to the SEC’s interpretation.51 
The Second Circuit did note, though, that if ever required to interpret 
subdivision (iii) itself, it “might well favor” the expansive interpretation, as 
it thought it was “doubtful” that Congress intended subdivision (iii) to have 
the “extremely limited scope” that it would have under the literal 
interpretation.52 At the same time, the Second Circuit acknowledged that it 
was difficult to know what Congress’s intentions were when it created 
subdivision (iii), as the provision was inserted into the Dodd-Frank Act at a 
late stage in the legislative process, and was not accompanied by any 
congressional guidance as to its purpose.53 
The Ninth Circuit, however, did not shy away from stamping 
subdivision (iii) with its own interpretation, albeit it noted that if it had not 
felt able to do so it would have nonetheless granted Chevron deference to the 
                                                                                                                           
 
46 Id. 
47 Somers, 850 F.3d at 1049. 
48 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2)(i)–(iii) (2017). 
49 Berman, 801 F.3d at 151–52. 
50 Somers, 850 F.3d at 1050; Berman, 801 F.3d at 151. 
51 Berman, 801 F.3d at 151. 
52 Id. at 155. 
53 Id. at 152–53. 
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SEC’s interpretation.54 While the Ninth Circuit conceded that the legislative 
history of the provision reveals nothing about its purpose, it found that the 
language of the provision itself sufficiently “illuminates congressional 
intent.”55 As far as the Ninth Circuit was concerned, Congress’s inclusion in 
subdivision (iii) of types of reporting that are impossible to perform, 
simultaneously with a report to the SEC, demonstrated that it did not intend 
for subdivision (iii) to be constrained by the statutory “whistleblower” 
definition.56 
In comparison, and for the same reasons articulated by the Second 
Circuit, excluding from the protection of subdivision (iii) those people who 
had not made a report to the SEC, would narrow the provision “to the point 
of absurdity.”57 Furthermore, and in response to one of the Fifth Circuit’s 
primary critiques of the expansive interpretation, the Ninth Circuit denied 
that the expansive interpretation rendered the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s 
whistleblower provisions redundant.58 On the contrary, the Ninth Circuit 
considered that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s whistleblower regime had several 
unique features which meant that some whistleblowers would find it more 
attractive than the Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime.59 For example, while the 
Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime only compensates whistleblowers for lost 
wages, the Sarbanes Oxley Act allows for special damages to compensate for 
other types of injuries, such as emotional distress.60 Additionally, while a 
claim brought under the Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime must be prosecuted 
by the whistleblower personally in a Federal Court, a whistleblower’s claim 
under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act can be dealt with through an administrative 
review by the Secretary of Labor.61 This procedure spares the whistleblower 
                                                                                                                           
 
54 Somers, 850 F.3d at 1050–51. 
55 Id. at 1049. 
56 To be clear, the expansive interpretation does not appear to negate the requirement that the report 
was about a securities law violation, rather than other types of illegal conduct. 
57 Somers, 850 F.3d at 1049. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 1050 (citing Jones v. South Peak Interactive Corp., 777 F.3d 658, 672 (4th Cir. 2015)). 
61 Id. (citing 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A(b)(1)(A)). However, the whistleblower may commence court 
proceedings if the Secretary of Labor fails to issue a decision on the matter within 180 days of the filing 
of the whistleblower’s complaint. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A(b)(1)(B). As the Fifth Circuit pointed out, 
though, a whistleblower who would prefer to have their claim dealt with through the courts would consider 
this to be a negative attribute of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s whistleblower scheme. See Asadi, 720 F.3d at 
629. 
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much of the stress and financial risk associated with court litigation.62 
Therefore, according to the Ninth Circuit, rather than usurping the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, the expansive interpretation merely increases the number of legal 
avenues available for whistleblowers to choose from.63 
III. IS THE EXPANSIVE INTERPRETATION CORRECT AS A MATTER OF 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION? 
This article will now consider the merits of the expansive approach as a 
matter of statutory interpretation. The article’s analysis will focus on the 
reasons cited by the Second and Ninth Circuits in defense of the expansive 
interpretation, and in opposition to the literal interpretation. This critique is 
relevant to both the question of whether the Second Circuit should have 
deemed the SEC’s interpretation to be reasonable (and therefore entitled to 
Chevron deference), and the question of whether the Ninth Circuit should 
have directly endorsed the expansive interpretation itself. 
The obvious issue with the expansive interpretation is that it creates two 
distinct definitions of the term “whistleblower,” thereby rendering the Dodd-
Frank Act internally inconsistent. While the definitions section of the Dodd-
Frank Act states that one of the primary defining characteristics of a 
“whistleblower” is that he or she made a disclosure to the SEC,64 the 
expansive interpretation does not require an individual to have reported to 
the SEC to qualify as a subdivision (iii) “whistleblower.” This is contrary to 
the fundamental canon of statutory interpretation that words should have 
consistent meanings throughout the same statute.65 In defense of this 
incongruity, the Second and Ninth Circuits cited the Supreme Court decision 
of King v. Burwell (“King”),66 which is authority for the proposition that a 
term of art can have different meanings in different parts of the same statute.67 
                                                                                                                           
 
62 Id. Although a whistleblower will be compensated for their legal fees if their claim under the 
Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime is successful they are nonetheless exposed to the risk of financial loss as 
they will not be compensated if their claim is unsuccessful. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(h)(1)(C). 
63 Somers, 850 F.3d at 1050. 
64 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(a)(6) (West 2010). 
65 Asadi, 720 F.3d at 622. 
66 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
67 Berman, 801 F.3d at 150; Somers, 850 F.3d at 1049. 
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But does the rule the Supreme Court described in King really support the 
expansive interpretation? It appears not. 
A. Supreme Court Authority 
The key part of King relied on by the Second and Ninth Circuits is the 
Supreme Court’s statement that: “the presumption of consistent usage readily 
yields to context, and a statutory term may mean different things in different 
places . . . This is particularly true when, as here, the Act is far from a chef 
d’oeuvre [a masterpiece] of legislative draftsmanship.”68 In support of that 
statement, the Supreme Court in King, in turn, referred to its prior declaration 
in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. Environmental Protection Agency (“Utility 
Air”), where the court explained that: 
One ordinarily assumes that identical words used in different parts of the same act 
are intended to have the same meaning. . . . [But] the presumption of consistent 
usage readily yields to context, and a statutory term—even one defined in the 
statute—may take on distinct characters from association with distinct statutory 
objects calling for different implementation strategies.69 
Although the principle set down in King and Utility Air—that the meaning 
of a term can “shapeshift” across a statute—is controversial,70 the Second 
and Ninth Courts can hardly be criticized for attempting to follow principles 
laid down by the Supreme Court. The real issue with the expansive 
interpretation, however, is not that it relies on a controversial Supreme Court 
principle, but rather that it misapplies that principle. Specifically, the 
expansive interpretation sets too low a threshold for the circumstances in 
which the courts can apply the principle from King and Utility Air. Properly 
understood, King and Utility Air should be treated as supporting the legal 
principle that the courts may only depart from the plain meaning of statutory 
language, and adopt an internally inconsistent interpretation where the 
statutory context clearly and unequivocally requires this.71 In other words, a 
                                                                                                                           
 
68 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2493 n.3 (internal quotation marks omitted) (cited in Somers, 850 F.3d at 
1049). 
69 Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2441 (2014) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
70 See Somers, 850 F.3d at 1051 (Owens, J., dissenting). 
71 Anton Metlitsky, The Roberts Court and the New Textualism, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 671, 686 
(2016). 
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high threshold must be overcome before the principle can be invoked.72 That 
this is the case should be apparent not only from looking at how the Supreme 
Court applied its own principle in King and Utility Air, but also from its 
warning that: “Reliance on context and structure in statutory interpretation is 
a subtle business, calling for great wariness lest what professes to be mere 
rendering becomes creation and attempted interpretation of legislation 
becomes legislation itself.”73 
With that warning in mind, this article will now briefly sketch out the 
details of the Supreme Court’s treatment of the legislation at issue in King 
and Utility Air.74 The purpose of this analysis is to understand the types of 
circumstances in which the Supreme Court considered it appropriate to adopt 
a statutory interpretation that is inconsistent with the language of the statute 
and other provisions within it. This analysis will demonstrate that the 
expansive interpretation is, ironically, the result of the Second and Ninth 
Circuits taking the Supreme Court’s statement in King at face value, rather 
than assessing it against the context in which it was made.75 
1. King v. Burwell 
Starting first with King, the primary issue in that case was whether 
individuals who purchase health insurance from insurance exchanges 
established by the Federal government are entitled to tax credits under the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“Affordable Care Act”).76 This 
issue turned on whether the phrase “an Exchange established by the State 
under [42 USC § 18031]” in 26 U.S.C.A. § 36B included federal 
exchanges.77 Although the black letter wording of the phrase appeared to only 
encapsulate exchanges established by State governments, the Supreme Court 
held that the Affordable Care Act’s tax credit provisions do apply to federal 
                                                                                                                           
 
72 Id. 
73 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2495–96 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Palmer v. Massachusetts, 
308 U.S. 79, 83 (2004)). 
74 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015); Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 
2441 (2014). 
75 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2496. 
76 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091 (2010). 
77 135 S. Ct. at 2487. 
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exchanges.78 This was because the entire purpose of the Affordable Care Act 
is to avoid economic “death spirals” in the health insurance market—a 
phenomenon whereby the number of people purchasing insurance decreases, 
resulting in higher premiums, leading to further decreases in the number of 
people purchasing insurance, and so on.79 The Affordable Care Act sought to 
avoid death spirals by both making health insurance more affordable 
(through granting tax credits to people who purchase health insurance on an 
“Exchange”) and making it compulsory for individuals to purchase health 
insurance, unless the cost of insurance would exceed 8% of the individual’s 
income, as calculated after applying their tax credit.80 This objective was 
explicitly articulated in the text of the Affordable Care Act.81 Furthermore, 
the Supreme Court had the benefit of a brief that the congressmen involved 
in the drafting of the statute had filed as aimici curiae;82 and the Court also 
deduced how the statute was intended to operate from the fact that it was 
based on a health insurance regime implemented in Massachusetts.83 
Taking into account this purpose, the Supreme Court concluded that 
interpreting the phrase “an Exchange established by the State under [42 USC 
§ 18031],” so that it excludes federal exchanges, would mean that many 
residents of states with a federal rather than state exchange would not receive 
tax credits.84 This would reduce the total number of people obligated to 
purchase health insurance in these states, and without the tax credits many 
residents’ incomes would be low enough to place the cost of health insurance 
above the 8% threshold.85 Health insurance would then become more 
expensive, which would in turn place more residents above the 8% 
threshold.86 The end result would be the very type of death spiral Congress 
had sought to avoid by passing the Affordable Care Act with health insurance 
premiums rising by as much as 47%, and enrollments decreasing by as much 
                                                                                                                           
 
78 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091 (2010). 
79 Id. 
80 135 S. Ct. at 2486. 
81 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091 (2010). 
82 Brief of Members of Congress and State Legislators as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, 
King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
83 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2486. 
84 42 U.S.C. § 18031. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
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as 70%.87 In order to avoid this outcome, the Supreme Court held that the 
phrase “an Exchange established by the State” in the Affordable Health Care 
Act’s tax credit provision included both state and federal exchanges.88 This 
interpretation departed significantly from the natural meaning of the statutory 
wording.89 
In his dissent, Justice Scalia noted that the statutory phrase at issue 
appeared in several segments of the Affordable Care Act, not just the tax 
credit provision.90 Therefore, the effect of the Court’s decision would be that 
those other usages of the phrase also constitute references to federal 
exchanges. The Court’s response, which was later invoked by the Ninth 
Circuit in Somers, is that this is not necessarily the case, as the Court had 
previously set down the principle in Utility Air that a term of art can have 
different meanings in different parts of the same statute.91 However, the 
Court did not issue a definitive ruling on the question of whether its 
interpretation of the phrase at issue was limited solely to the phrase’s usage 
in the tax credit provision, as it was not necessary to do so to dispose of the 
case.92 
2. Utility Air Regulatory Group v. Environmental Protection Agency 
Turning to Utility Air, that case was concerned with the meaning of the 
term “air pollutant” in the Clean Air Act, which had a statutory definition of: 
“any air pollution agent or combination of such agents, including any 
physical, chemical, biological [or] radioactive . . . substance or matter which 
is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air.”93 The Supreme Court 
previously held in Massachusetts v. EPA that the Environmental Protection 
Agency (“EPA”), has authority to regulate new motor vehicles under Title II 
of the Clean Air Act, as motor vehicles emit greenhouse gases, which qualify 
as “air pollutants.”94 Following the Massachusetts decision, the EPA formed 
                                                                                                                           
 
87 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2492–94. 
88 Id. at 2494. 
89 Id. at 2495. 
90 Id. at 2498–99 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
91 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2494. 
92 Id. at 2493 n.3. 
93 42 U.S.C.A. § 7602(g) (1955). 
94 Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1459–62 (2007). 
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the view that as Title II of the Clean Air Act applied to new motor vehicles, 
this meant that Title V and the Prevention of Significant Deterioration 
(“PSD”) program sections of the Clean Air Act (both of which also regulate 
sources of “air pollutants”), likewise applied to motor vehicles.95 The 
Supreme Court disagreed.96 
If the Supreme Court had blindly applied the Massachusetts 
interpretation of “air pollutants” to Title V and the PSD program, then it 
would have reached a conclusion in favor of the EPA’s viewpoint.97 
However, the Court eschewed this approach. Instead, the Court performed a 
robust analysis of whether it was appropriate to extend the Massachusetts 
interpretation to Title V and the PSD program.98 In construing the term “air 
pollutants” within the context of Title V and the PSD program the Court 
focused primarily on the consequences of the EPA’s interpretation.99 The 
conclusion reached was that these consequences would be dire.100 
Specifically, the Court found that adopting the EPA’s proposed interpretation 
would cause the number of PSD program permit applications per annum to 
increase from 800 to 82,000, and the number of annual Title V permit 
applications to increase from 15,000 to 6.1 billion.101 This would impose 
significant administrative burdens on the EPA, as the PSD program permit 
application procedure was “complicated, resource-intensive, time-
consuming and sometimes contentious,”102 while the Title V application 
procedure was “finely crafted for thousands, not millions of sources.”103 For 
example, under both the PSD program and Title V, it is necessary to hold a 
public hearing on each application. This would in turn most likely cause the 
PSD program’s administrative costs to increase from $12 million to over $1.5 
billion, while Title V administrative costs would increase from $62 million 
to $21 billion.104 Furthermore, most of the additional entities that would be 
pulled under the umbrellas of Title V and the PSD program would be small-
                                                                                                                           
 
95 Utility Air Regulatory Group, 134 S. Ct. at 2436–37. 
96 Id. at 2437. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 2337–45. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 2443. 
103 Id. at 2444. 
104 Id. at 2442–43. 
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scale polluters, who would collectively face costs of $147 billion as a 
result.105 
In light of this context, the Supreme Court held that for the purposes of 
Title V and the PSD program, the term “air pollutant” excludes greenhouse 
gases.106 The Court acknowledged that as it had previously declared under 
Title II of the Clean Air Act, “air pollutants” included greenhouse gases.107 
The effect of its decision was that the meaning of this term changes from 
section to section of the Clean Air Act. However, in its defense, the Supreme 
Court laid down the rule that it would later cite in King: “a statutory term—
even one defined in the statute—may take on distinct characters from 
association with distinct statutory objects calling for different 
implementation strategies.”108 
3. Reassessing the Expansive Interpretation’s Application of King v. 
Burwell 
The above examination of King and Utility Air demonstrates how 
different the legislative provisions at issue in those cases were from 
subdivision (iii), and why those decisions therefore do not support the 
expansive interpretation. Specifically, there are two crucial differences 
between King and Utility Air on one hand, and subdivision (iii) on the other: 
the existence of evidence of actual and imputed congressional intent.109 
Starting with actual intent, as outlined above, in King the Supreme Court 
had access to substantial information as to Congress’s actual intentions when 
it created the statutory provision at issue.110 This information gave the Court 
the confidence to interpret the statutory provisions at issue in a manner that 
departed from the natural meaning of the language used.111 In stark contrast, 
subdivision (iii) was inserted into the Dodd-Frank Act at a late stage in the 
                                                                                                                           
 
105 Id. at 2443. For example, under the Prevention of Significant Deterioration regime the EPA is 
required to consider each polluter’s application for a permit within one year, during which it must hold a 
public hearing on the application. 
106 127 S. Ct. at 2444. 
107 Id. 
108 Utility Air Regulatory Group, 134 S. Ct. at 2441 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
109 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2480 (2015); Utility Air Regulatory Group, 134 S. Ct. at 2427. 
110 135 S. Ct. at 2480. 
111 Id. 
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legislative process, and was not accompanied by any explanation of its 
purpose. Accordingly, and as the Second and Ninth Circuits acknowledged, 
no extrinsic evidence whatsoever exists as to what Congress hoped to achieve 
with subdivision (iii).112 Therefore, it is not possible to justify the expansive 
interpretation, or any interpretation for that matter, by reference to what 
Congress’s actual intentions were when enacting subdivision (iii). 
In considering imputed intent, a factor supporting the interpretations the 
Supreme Court adopted in King and Utility Air, was that the consequences of 
adhering to the plain meanings of the statutory language would be so 
unpalatable that it could be inferred that Congress had not intended those 
results. In King the evidence before the Court demonstrated that adopting a 
literal interpretation of the statutory provision at issue would have caused 
health insurance costs to skyrocket and enrolments to nose-dive.113 In Utility 
Air, adopting a literal interpretation would have brought billions of small-
scale sources of greenhouse gases into the domain of the Clean Air Act and, 
in turn, imposed tens of billions of dollars in costs on the EPA and third 
parties.114 Therefore, in the absence of an explicit statement of Congress’s 
objective, it could be inferred that Congress had not intended these extreme 
outcomes. 
In comparison, while the consequences of adopting the literal 
interpretation of subdivision (iii) may be viewed as suboptimal by some, 
those consequences could hardly be described as so disastrous that Congress 
cannot possibly have intended them. Although the literal interpretation grants 
the protection of the Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime to a smaller class of 
individuals than the expansive interpretation, most of those excluded will 
nonetheless continue to receive protection from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s 
whistleblower protection regime,115 and § 1513(e) of Title 18.116 
Accordingly, while the narrow interpretation deprives many individuals of 
the benefits of the Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime, those individuals will not 
                                                                                                                           
 
112 Berman, 801 F.3d at 152–23; Somers, 850 F.3d at 1049. 
113 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2493–94. 
114 Utility Air Regulatory Group, 134 S. Ct. at 2444. 
115 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A (2015). 
116 18 U.S.C.A. § 1513(e) (2015) (indirectly protects informants by making it a federal offense to 
retaliate against someone who provides “information relating to the commission or possible commission 
of any Federal offense” to a law enforcement officer—thereby creating a deterrent effect). 
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usually be left without recourse.117 In fact, and as noted above,118 in many 
ways the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s whistleblower protections are superior to the 
Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime, and one would expect that many 
whistleblowers may prefer the former over the latter if given a choice. 
For example, whistleblowers who suffered significant emotional 
distress due to the retaliatory conduct will be more likely to be made whole 
by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s whistleblower provisions than the Dodd-Frank 
Retaliation Regime.119 Similarly, many whistleblowers may balk at the 
prospect of litigating their case under the Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime in 
a federal court, and instead prefer the administrative procedure set out in the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.120 That being so, it can hardly be said that the literal 
interpretation produces sufficiently bad outcomes that it can be inferred that 
Congress did not intend this result. This is an argument that the Ninth Circuit 
unwittingly and implicitly accepted when, as noted above, it identified that 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s whistleblower provisions are in many ways 
superior to the Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime.121 Ironically, in its attempt 
to rebut the argument that the Expansive Interpretation renders the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act’s whistleblower protections redundant, the Ninth Circuit has 
served only to highlight the extent to which the Dodd-Frank Retaliation 
Regime is distinct from the statutory regimes at issue in King and Utility 
Air.122 
B. Auditors and Attorneys 
Of course, defenders of the expansive interpretation would disagree that 
the negative consequences of the literal interpretation are as trivial as 
suggested above. In fact, in support of their predictions of adverse 
consequences, the Second and Ninth Circuits have identified two key 
casualties of the literal interpretation: auditors and attorneys.123 As discussed 
                                                                                                                           
 
117 Berman, 801 F.3d at 159 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). 
118 See discussion infra Section 2.2. 
119 Somers, 850 F.3d at 1050 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Jones v. SouthPeak Interactive Corp., 777 F.3d 
658, 672 (4th Cir. 2015)). 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2480 (2015); Utility Air Regulatory Group, 134 S. Ct. at 2427. 
123 Id. 
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above,124 according to those courts, the literal interpretation denies auditors 
and attorneys access to the Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime, as they cannot 
legally blow the whistle to the SEC without first reporting internally 
(meaning that retaliation will most likely occur before they can secure the 
Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime’s protection).125 
On its face this appears to be a compelling argument. If the literal 
interpretation fails to protect two categories of individual that are indirectly 
mentioned by subdivision (iii), then this would suggest that this interpretation 
is inconsistent with congressional intent. The problem with this argument, 
though, it lacks self-awareness. In portraying auditors and attorneys as 
victims of the literal interpretation, champions of the expansive interpretation 
have overlooked an important detail—their preferred interpretation does not 
bring attorneys and auditors under the Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime 
either. This is because the Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime does not cover all 
forms of retaliation.126 Instead, the statutory text provides that: “No employer 
may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, directly or indirectly, or in 
any other manner discriminate against, a whistleblower in the terms and 
conditions of employment.”127 The emphasized words—“employer” and 
“terms and conditions of employment”—clearly limit the Dodd-Frank 
Retaliation Regime to retaliatory conduct that occurs in the context of an 
employment relationship.128 An entity that retaliates against a non-employee 
will not fit within the wording of the retaliation provision as it will not be 
retaliating in its capacity as an “employer,” nor will it have retaliated against 
the non-employee “in the terms and conditions of employment.”129 This 
notion that the Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime is limited to employment 
relationships is further confirmed by the remedies it provides. The Dodd-
Frank Retaliation Regime awards successful plaintiffs with “back pay,”130 
which is typically understood to mean “The wages or salary that an employee 
                                                                                                                           
 
124 Id. 
125 See also Thomas J. McCormac IV, Circuit Split: How Far Does Whistleblower Protection 
Extend Under Dodd-Frank?, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 475, 494–96 (2017). 
126 Id. 
127 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (2015) (emphasis added). 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(h)(1)(C)(ii) (2015). 
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should have received but did not because of an employer’s unlawful action 
in setting or paying the wages or salary.”131 
Similarly, plaintiffs are entitled to “reinstatement with the same 
seniority status,”132 a phrase that must surely refer to reinstatement to a 
position of employment, as it is difficult to envision what it would mean for 
an independent contractor to have “seniority status.”133 As the Dodd-Frank 
Retaliation Regime only applies where an employer retaliates against an 
employee, it follows that even under the expansive interpretation subdivision 
(iii), attorneys and auditors will not be protected. This is because all auditors, 
and most attorneys, do not and cannot form employment relationships with 
their clients. Starting first with auditors, Chapter 2B requires audits to be 
performed by a “registered public accounting firm,” which is defined as: “a 
proprietorship, partnership, incorporated association, corporation, limited 
liability company, limited liability partnership, or other legal entity that is 
engaged in the practice of public accounting or preparing or issuing audit 
reports”134 It is trite law that only a natural person can be an employee. 
Accordingly, the absence of a “natural person” (or similar language) from 
the list of types of entities described in the “registered public accounting 
firm” definition precludes one from becoming an employee.135 Admittedly, 
Chapter 2B also provides that “any associated person” of a public accounting 
firm will also qualify as a public accounting firm, albeit only “to the extent 
so designated by the rules of the [Public Company Accounting Oversight] 
Board.”136 In turn, the rules adopted by the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board define an “auditor” as being both a public accounting firm 
registered with the Board and “associated persons thereof.”137 However, it is 
unlikely that an individual could simultaneously be an employee of an 
                                                                                                                           
 
131 Backpay, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
132 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(h)(1)(C)(i) (2015). 
133 Id. 
134 15 U.S.C.A. § 7201(11)(A) (2015). 
135 Id.; see generally 17 C.F.R. § 240.2F-2 (stating the SEC definition that “a whistleblower must 
be an individual. A company or another entity is not eligible to be a whistleblower.” It is also worth noting 
that the SEC’s rule concerning the definition of a whistleblower states that “A whistleblower must be an 
individual. A company or another entity is not eligible to be a whistleblower.”). 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2. 
136 15 U.S.C.A. § 7201(11)(B) (2018). 
137 PUB. CO. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., Bylaw and Rules of the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board r. 1001(a)(xii) (Jan. 31, 2017), https://pcaobus.org/Rules/Documents/PCAOB-Rules.pdf 
(https://pcaobus.org/Rules/Documents/PCAOB-Rules-Table-of-Contents.pdf). 
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audited entity while also having a sufficiently close association with a public 
accounting company to trigger the above definition. Even if it were 
theoretically possible, such occurrences would be rare in practice. 
Even if the above analysis were incorrect, there would still be little 
doubt that Chapter 2B auditors cannot be employees of the companies they 
audit.138 Under rules promulgated by the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board, which is empowered by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to create 
rules relating to auditors’ independence,139 auditors must “be independent of 
the firm’s audit client,”140 and SEC rules further state that an auditor will not 
be independent if he or she has an employment relationship with the issuer.141 
That being so, it follows that an auditor is legally unable to establish the 
employment relationship necessary to trigger the Dodd-Frank Retaliation 
Regime. This is reinforced by several other provisions in Chapter 2B, 
including: prohibitions on the non-auditory services that a public accounting 
firm can provide to an issuer it has been commissioned to audit,142 a 
limitation on the number of occasions on which a particular member of a 
registered public accounting firm can act as the lead person for audits of the 
same entity143 which fetters on the ability of a public accounting firm to audit 
entities who previously employed senior employees of the firm.144 
A similar logic applies to attorneys. While in-house attorneys are 
employees and would therefore be protected under the expansive 
interpretation, external counsel work under retainer contracts, rather than 
employment contracts, with their clients. Therefore, although the expansive 
interpretation protects in-house attorneys from retaliation, external counsel 
will remain unprotected. This conclusion is again reinforced by the remedies 
available under the Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime. As noted above, one of 
the primary remedies available to a successful subdivision (iii) plaintiff is 
reinstatement to his or her previous position.145 This remedy would be 
                                                                                                                           
 
138 15 U.S.C. § 7213(a)(2)(B)(i) (2018). 
139 15 U.S.C. § 7213(a)(2)(B)(i) (2018); 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (2018) (creating the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board). 
140 PUB. CO. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., supra note 137. See Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight 
Bd., AS 1005 Independence, https://pcaobus.org/Standards/Auditing/Pages/AS1005.aspx. 
141 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c)(2) (2018). 
142 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1(g)–(i) (2018). 
143 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1(j) (2018). 
144 Id. 
145 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(i)–(iii) (West 2010). 
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meaningless for external counsel in most states as the American Bar 
Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct allow a client to discharge 
his or her lawyer “at any time, with or without cause.”146 Similarly, as 
external counsel generally perform work, and therefore accrue fees as and 
when required by their clients, it is hard to imagine how their back pay would 
be calculated. Accordingly, one of the Second and Ninth Circuit’s main 
rationales for adopting the expansive interpretation is weak. As the expansive 
interpretation does not bring auditors and external counsel under the 
protection of the Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime, the argument that the 
literal interpretation should be rejected because it fails to protect auditors and 
attorneys and thus, is illogical.147 Perhaps, there are other entities who are 
unable to report an issue internally at the same time as they make a report to 
the SEC, and who would be protected by the expansive interpretation but 
unprotected by the literal interpretation. But if such entities do exist, then, the 
Second and Ninth Circuits, and other defenders of the expansive 
interpretation,148 have failed to identify them. 
A determined defender of the expansive interpretation could perhaps 
make one last attempt to save it by arguing that the words “employer” and 
“employment” should be given a relaxed interpretation that is not limited 
solely to the generally understood legal meaning of the term. Such an 
argument would collapse under its own weight. As the primary justification 
for the expansive interpretation is that the context in which the word 
“whistleblower” appears requires that it be given an unorthodox 
interpretation for the purposes of subdivision (iii), it would be nonsensical to 
further argue that the contextual wording must itself be reinterpreted. 
                                                                                                                           
 
146 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16, cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983); the ABA Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct have been largely adopted in all states except California. See Am. Bar 
Ass’n, Model Rules of Professional Conduct, AMERICANBAR.ORG, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/ 
professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct.html (last visited 
Apr. 18, 2017). 
147 This paper has not considered whether it would be possible for a junior employee within a legal 
services or auditing organization to receive Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime protection against retaliation 
from their own employer. 
148 See, e.g., McCormac, supra note 125, at 494–95. 
126 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 36:101 
 
Vol. 36, No. 2 (2018) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2018.139 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
C. Statutory Interpretation—Conclusion 
In his dissent in King, Justice Scalia stated that “the more unnatural the 
proposed interpretation of a law, the more compelling the contextual 
evidence must be to show it is correct.”149 As the expansive interpretation is 
a significant departure from the natural meaning of the language used in the 
Dodd-Frank Act, one would expect it to be supported by contextual factors 
as potent as those in King and Utility Air.150 The above analysis demonstrates 
that this is not the case. 
IV. IS THE EXPANSIVE INTERPRETATION DESIRABLE FROM A POLICY 
PERSPECTIVE? 
This paper will now critique the two main policy reasons that have been 
provided in support of the Expansive Interpretation. The first is the argument 
that whistleblower laws should incentivize employees to report issues 
internally rather than notifying the SEC immediately upon discovering 
illegalities. The second policy argument concerns a topic already discussed 
in this paper: the plight of auditors and attorneys. 
A. Employee Incentives 
One of the purported advantages of the expansive interpretation is that 
it incentivizes employees to report illegal conduct internally rather than to 
the SEC.151 Put briefly, the argument made is that as the Dodd-Frank 
Retaliation Regime provides protections regardless of whether employees 
report internally or to the SEC, they will be free to decide to whom they 
report. Many employees will therefore report internally rather than to the 
SEC, as internal reporting carries a lower risk of triggering retaliation.152 To 
the extent that the expansive interpretation incentivizes employees to report 
internally before approaching the SEC, it is then, an advantageous outcome 
for all stakeholders, and therefore a reason to favor the expansive 
interpretation. Employers benefit from internal reporting as it gives them the 
                                                                                                                           
 
149 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2497. 
150 Id. at 2480; Utility Air Regulatory Group, 134 S. Ct. at 2427. 
151 McCormac, supra note 125, at 493–94. 
152 See Berman, 801 F.3d at 151. 
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opportunity to assess whether a problem in fact exists, and if necessary 
correct and self-report the problem to the SEC, thereby potentially mitigating 
the consequences of the illegal activity. The SEC will also benefit, as it is 
likely to be more efficient for the employer itself to investigate and remedy 
the illegal activity. Furthermore, internal reporting also helps ensure that the 
SEC’s time is not wasted with baseless allegations, as “the subject company 
may at times be better able to distinguish between meritorious and frivolous 
claims.”153 Finally, if internal reporting does in fact carry a lower risk of 
retaliation, then employees also benefit because even though they would 
have recourse under the Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime, most employees 
would prefer to avoid the retaliation altogether rather than undergo the ordeal 
of bringing legal proceedings. Additionally, employees who have a degree of 
loyalty to their employers are likely to consider internal reporting to be 
preferable, as it will give the employers the opportunity to obtain leniency 
from the SEC.154 
The problem with this argument is not its premise, but rather its 
conclusion. Having claimed that it is preferable if employees initially report 
illegal activity internally, advocates for the expansive interpretation then 
argue that the literal interpretation is flawed, as it will cause a significant 
number of employees to report to the SEC rather than solely whistleblowing 
internally.155 This argument has two key defects. First, many of the types of 
disclosures described in subdivision (iii) are, by definition, external 
disclosures. For example, § 1513(e) of Title 18 protects disclosures made to 
“law enforcement officer[s].”156 Accordingly, the expansive interpretation 
cannot encourage exclusively internal reporting for such disclosures. 
Secondly, the main category of internal reporting brought under the 
Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime by the expansive interpretation is securities 
law violation disclosures protected by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.157 However, 
individuals who engage in such reporting already enjoy the whistleblower 
                                                                                                                           
 
153 McCormac, supra note 125, at 493. 
154 Of course, these advantages need to be balanced against the primary disadvantage, which is that 
if an employee reports an issue internally first then the company will have an opportunity to cover up the 
indiscretion, for example, by destroying evidence or using non-retaliatory tactics to convince the 
employee to keep quiet. 
155 McCormac, supra note 125, at 494. 
156 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e) (2012). 
157 18 U.S.C. § 1514(a) (2012). 
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protections provided by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.158 These protections are, 
according to the Ninth Circuit, in many ways preferable to the Dodd-Frank 
Retaliation Regime.159 It is therefore unlikely that the literal interpretation 
would incentivize significant numbers of employees to report to the SEC in 
addition to reporting internally, as most internal reporters would be content 
with their Sarbanes-Oxley Act protections. Perhaps defenders of the 
expansive interpretation could respond to this point by conceding that the 
Ninth Circuit was incorrect when it said many employees prefer the 
Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower protections to the Dodd-Frank Retaliation 
Regime.160 However, this response would also be a tacit admission that one 
of the Fifth Circuit’s primary criticisms of the Expansive Interpretation—that 
it renders the Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower protections redundant—is 
correct (as if all whistleblowers who make disclosures protected by the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act are entitled to use the Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime, 
and if the Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime is objectively superior to the 
Sarbanes-Oxley regime, the Sarbanes-Oxley regime will become redundant 
in a securities law context).161 
B. Are Auditors and Attorneys Worthy of Protection? 
The second policy argument made in support of the expansive 
interpretation is that auditors and attorneys deserve protection from the 
Dodd-Frank Retaliation Regime. This is largely a moot question as, for the 
reasons outlined above, even the expansive interpretation does not produce 
this outcome.162 Nonetheless, for the sake of completeness it is worth 
pointing out that there are two reasons to doubt that auditors and attorneys 
are deserving of the concern exhibited by the Second and Ninth Circuits,163 
as well as non-judicial commentators.164 
First, as auditors and most attorneys are not employees of their clients, 
the consequences of retaliation are less severe. Employees who suffer a 
                                                                                                                           
 
158 Id. 
159 Somers, 850 F.3d at 1050. 
160 18 U.S.C. § 1514(a) (2012). 
161 Asadi, 720 F.3d at 628–29. 
162 See discussion infra Section 2.2. 
163 Berman, 801 F.3d at 151–52. See also Somers, 850 F.3d at 1049. 
164 McCormac, supra note 125, at 495. 
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retaliatory dismissal lose their primary source of income, and may also suffer 
damage to their personal well-being.165 Auditors and external counsel on the 
other hand, usually have a portfolio of clients, meaning that the financial and 
psychological consequences of retaliation are comparatively minor. 
The second distinction is the presence, or lack thereof, of professional 
obligations. As employees who report illegal activity within their 
organization are essentially going beyond the call of duty, it is therefore fair 
and just that the law protects them from retaliation. In comparison, auditors 
and attorneys who engage in whistleblowing are merely fulfilling the 
obligations they voluntarily undertook when they entered their professions. 
By definition, an auditor’s role is to discover and report issues within their 
clients’ businesses. There therefore seems to be less need to create incentives 
for auditors to participate in whistleblowing as it is a core component of the 
career they have chosen to pursue. Similarly, to join the legal profession, and 
enjoy the various privileges attached to it, an individual must agree to various 
quasi-whistleblower obligations. The American Bar Association Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct expect attorneys employed or retained by a 
corporation to internally report illegal activity being performed, or about to 
be performed, by members of that organization.166 
Attorneys are also expected to make disclosures necessary to prevent 
clients from committing crimes likely to result in substantial financial 
harm,167 or mitigate the financial harm caused by crimes their clients 
committed through the use of the attorneys’ services.168 These obligations are 
largely similar to those imposed on issuers’ attorneys by the SEC’s Standards 
of Professional Conduct.169 That being said, there is little reason to demand 
that attorneys receive special protections for complying with SEC reporting 
obligations that are in substance, the same as the ethical obligations they 
undertook when they entered the legal profession. It is also hard to see why 
                                                                                                                           
 
165 Sarah A. Bugard et al., Toward a Better Estimation of the Effect of Job Loss on Health, 48 J. OF 
HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 369 (2007). 
166 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13(a)–(e) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). See also r. 1.6(b)(2)–
(3) and Barry R. Temkin & Ben Moskovits, Lawyers as Whistleblowers Under the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform Act: Ethical Conflicts Under the Rules of Professional Conduct and SEC Rules, 84 NYSBA 
J. 10, 12–16 (2012). 
167 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
168 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(3) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
169 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b) (2017). 
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attorneys acting for issuers should be protected from retaliation for reporting 
securities law violations,170 when attorneys who report other types of illegal 
conduct performed by their clients are not protected. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The story of subdivision (iii)’s creation and interpretation is ultimately 
a tale of oversight. When drafting subdivision (iii) Congress erred by failing 
to understand the confusion that its casual use of the term “whistleblower” 
would cause. But one error does not justify another, and in their haste to 
formulate an interpretation that they considered palatable the Second and 
Ninth Circuits have made several oversights of their own. If the Second and 
Ninth Circuits had properly assessed the full scope of the statutory regime at 
issue, as well as the Supreme Court authority they invoked, then perhaps they 
would have reached different conclusions. As noted above, the Circuit Split 
should soon come to an end when the Supreme Court rules on the appeal of 
the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Somers. Unless defenders of the expansive 
interpretation can provide the Supreme Court with fresh and persuasive 
reasons in favor of this approach, then the Supreme Court should overturn 
the Ninth Circuit’s decision and adopt the literal interpretation instead. 
                                                                                                                           
 
170 See, e.g., McCormac, supra note 125, at 495. 
